If the Musharraf government
wants broad-based support in pursuing peace with India
it should put its domestic house in order and initiate
positive engagement with the major opposition parties.
Pakistan’s relations with India cannot be divorced
from domestic politics because they carry long historical
baggage and evoke strong sentiments
President Pervez Musharraf’s recent
proposal on Kashmir articulates Pakistan’s flexibility
with new ideas for seeking a pragmatic solution of the
Kashmir problem. It does not offer the final prescription
for solving the Kashmir problem but advances certain ideas
for initiating a debate in Pakistan and India on the possible
solutions prior to the initiation of talks on Kashmir
between the two countries.
The proposal is not entirely new. Similar
proposals focusing on the composition of population in
different regions have been available at the non-official
level. A host of ideas, even detailed proposals, besides
these have also been floated by various think tanks, academicians,
intellectuals and political activists. So far, neither
India nor Pakistan has officially owned any such proposal.
What is important about President Pervez Musharraf’s
statement is the fact that for the first time the top
Pakistani leader has publicly proposed a solution reaffirming
Pakistan’s willingness to move away from its traditional
position on Kashmir. It is a unilateral gesture but it
cannot become operational unless India, too, indicates
flexibility.
President Pervez Musharraf gave the first
indications of flexibility in Pakistan’s stance
on the eve of the Agra summit in July 2001 when he suggested
that Pakistan would accept any solution acceptable to
the people of Kashmir. After the failure of Agra summit
Pakistan returned to its traditional position. The new
formulation was however mentioned by Pakistani officials
on several occasions. On September 20, 2002, the president
suggested a four-phase approach for evolving an agreement
on Kashmir “on the basis of [the] alternatives to
[the] long-held positions”.
On December 18, 2003 he talked of going
beyond the stated positions for solving the Kashmir problem.
He stated that Pakistan would be willing to leave aside
the UN resolutions if India showed flexibility. The latest
statement, issued on October 25, 2004, floats specific
ideas involving a region-based partition for the final
disposal of the Kashmir problem.
Musharraf’s latest proposal talks
of identifying various regions in Kashmir as a part of
an effort to evolve a solution acceptable to the parties.
Two of the regions are currently under Pakistani control
and the rest under Indian control. These regions are:
(1) the Azad Jammu and Ksahmir; (2) the Federally Administered
Northern Areas, (3) the Kashmir valley, (4) Jammu, (5)
the Poonch-Rajori area, (6) Dras-Kargil and (7) Ladakh.
Determination of final status of these areas is proposed
on the basis of an agreement reached through dialogue.
The statement has evoked diverse reactions
in India and Pakistan because it goes beyond a general
call for flexibility. India’s official response
has been cautious. A spokesman for India’s Ministry
of External Affairs maintained that ideas on Kashmir should
be exchanged through the on-going dialogue process rather
than aired through the media.
Over the last ten months India has shown
a cautious flexibility on Kashmir. It has not reiterated
its official position that Kashmir is an integral part
of India. It also uses the phrase “all issues including
Kashmir” to describe the agenda for the dialogue
between the two countries. However, its policy makers
— mostly retired bureaucrats — and other pro-government
elements are not inclined towards taking into account
all possible solutions in order to evolve an acceptable
solution. They still think that India can find an ‘internal
solution’ by granting the Indian-administered Kashmir
autonomy within the framework of Indian constitution.
Pakistan is relevant to such a solution only in terms
of stopping militants from crossing into Indian-administered
Kashmir and to the extent of recognition of LoC as the
international border.
India’s policy makers are not likely
to respond positively to any specific solution of the
Kashmir problem as long as they view the internal autonomy
solution as a viable option. They want to buy time to
once again try it out. Therefore, the dialogue on Kashmir
is expected to proceed slowly. India would prefer to delay
a detailed review of specific proposals. The ‘go
slow’ approach will be contested by Pakistan because
it wants early movement in the direction of Kashmir solution.
There is another reason for India’s
disapproval of public discussion of specific proposals.
It tends to build international pressure on India for
reciprocating. Given India’s preference for an internal
solution, it is not inclined to discuss all available
options.
The proposal has also evoked divergent
responses in Pakistan. The Jamaat-i-Islami leaders see
it as a sell-out to India being pursued under US pressure
and have issued strident statements against it, describing
it as a betrayal of those who sacrificed their lives for
the Kashmir cause. They want Pakistan to insist on the
implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. The PML-N
leaders, too, have expressed reservations to the proposal.
Raja Zafarul Haq, the PML-N chairman, has said the proposal
goes against vital interests of the country. The PPPP
has been cautiously critical.
Whereas the Islamist parties oppose the
proposal on ideological grounds, the PML-N and the PPPP
— as well as some other opposition parties —
are seen as refusing to support the statement on account
of their strained relations with the government in the
domestic political context. Several parties — including
the PPP and the ANP — favour improved relations
and peaceful settlement of disputes with India but are
not expected to support President Musharraf. Their opposition
stems from the growing polarisation between the government
and the opposition. If the government wants to build support
for its flexible approach towards Kashmir, it must improve
its relations with the opposition.
The underlying assumption in General Musharraf’s
statement is flexibility leading to a solution of the
Kashmir problem that is acceptable to Pakistan, India
and Kashmiris. The perspective is widely shared in Pakistan.
With the exception of the hardline Islamist parties and
jihadi groups, the general consensus is that Pakistan
must strive for a pragmatic solution that protects its
national interests and enjoys the blessings of the people
of Kashmir.
However, support for peace with India
and a pragmatic solution of Kashmir does not necessarily
mean that specific policy measures would get automatic
support from the political circles. If confrontation between
the government and the opposition persists, the opposition
might not extend support for specific strategies of peace
with India. Therefore, if Musharraf government wants broad-based
support in pursuing peace with India it should put its
domestic house in order and initiate positive engagement
with the major opposition parties. Pakistan’s relations
with India cannot be divorced from domestic politics because
they carry a long historical baggage and evoke strong
sentiments. Consensus-building through positive engagement
with the opposition will strengthen the government’s
position in the dialogue with India.
