This week’s renewed warning from the head of the UN’s office on drugs and crime, alerting to the danger of Afghanistan heading towards becoming a narco-state, deserves to be seen as an opportunity for global action. For the war battered central Asian central, proliferating flow of drugs on top of a widely shattered infrastructure and economy comes indeed as a deepening security challenge. But claiming that Afghanistan’s former Taliban rulers and members of ‘al-Qaeda’ could indeed be among the major beneficiaries of the drug trade, needlessly tends to politicise the debate at a time when the international community must unite to combat what promises to be one of the gravest challenges faced by the modern world.

More than two years after the New York terrorist attacks prompted the US to attack Afghanistan and remove its ‘Taliban’ rulers from power, simple economics promises to lift or indeed aggravate the already fast deteriorating situation. The UN estimates the value of Afghanistan’s last opium produce at more than U$2 billion that is a spectacular sum for an impoverished country. That output may well receive a lift this year, thanks to the higher rainfall across the region that in turn is bound to improve output of different crops.

Even if several hundred million dollars from that crop fall in to the hands of militant groups-as suspected by some drug experts, there’s a considerable sum of money which nevertheless ends up in the hands of a number of vested interest groups and individuals, ranging from ordinary farmers to local businessmen and perhaps even corrupt officials. The menacing effect of Afghanistan’s drug trade ought to be judged not just by virtue of whom receives the pay-offs, but indeed, the significant portion of Afghans who feel compelled to become part of the vicious circle of the drug underworld.

For most Afghans and understandably so, the biggest frustration must come with the failure of the United States in either pouring in more security troops or steeply pushing up the flow of new economic aid. Unless vastly broken down infrastructure in large parts of Afghanistan is rehabilitated on a fast track, the idea of eventual economic rehabilitation may never come together. By all accounts so far, the relative prosperity seen today is largely concentrated in Kabul, the capital, and perhaps one or two other large urban centres. But in a largely nomadic, agricultural country, with significantly arid conditions, there can be little hope for rehabilitation unless a sweeping effort is undertaken to clean large parts of the country side from the many land mines left behind from the war. Additionally, ranges of other significant inputs that are necessary for agro-rehabilitation are necessary to be poured in on the fast track.

Tackling Afghanistan’s drug malaise in part must also be about dealing with its still confused political realities. In the aftermath of the New York terrorist attacks, Afghan president Hamid Karzai emerged on the horizon as the saviour of the central Asian state, representing values sharply in contrast to those espoused by the Taliban. For Afghanistan and perhaps even for its surrounding region, Mr Karzai has brought along a breath of fresh air. Pakistanis must give him credit for being the first to turn the wheels of his country away from its journey towards ‘Talibanisation’.

But Mr Karzai’s political credentials pose many significant questions. For instance, the large segment of mainstream Afghans still need to rally behind him as he heads towards delivering the new century’s first constitutional political set up for his country. Mr Karzai’s close backing by the United States does not necessarily win him complete favours with the Afghan people. While the fear of the ‘Taliban’ returning one day may haunt many Afghans and therefore by default may force them to extend their continued support to Mr Karzai, the rising frustration with the United States, nevertheless, must also contribute to a political deterioration.

The next test for Afghanistan’s western donors comes at an aid conference in Germany this spring where new pledges are expected to be made in line with global concerns over the central Asian country’s crisis. That test would indeed be two-fold. On the one hand, donors would need to demonstrate their generosity by making substantially larger commitments than before. But more significantly, they would have to demonstrate their eagerness to actually deliver their commitments on a fast track basis. The failure to help Afghanistan in this hour of crucial need must only work to strengthen the hand of drug traffickers in an unprecedented way. A new action plan just therefore is built upon three equally important pillars.

First, an increasingly intense effort has to be put in motion to take fresh stock of Afghanistan’s security needs. In the short term, there are many who argue in favours of largely presence of troops from the United States and NATO countries. But in the long term, there can be no alternative to a home-grown all-Afghan military that takes responsibility for important security duties. The very fundamentals of any state must depend on its ability to enforce the will of its government, and the case of Afghanistan is therefore no different. As long as Mr Karzai remains dependent on foreign troops to keep his government intact, his writ on Afghanistan would be considered to remain weak and open to question.

Second, a new political process needs to combine a mix of Afghan tradition with western democratic values. While events such as the ‘loya jirga’ — the grand assembly, have indeed attracted much attention from outside Afghanistan, there also appears to be a yearning in some western capitals to see the central Asian country move towards the best ideals of democracy. Tragically though, there are many variables in Afghanistan to suggest that many Afghans, especially in the rural areas may, indeed resent a fast track move towards a representative form of government that makes it acceptable to the western world. The road to the future must therefore be carved in view of what is best acceptable to Afghans than what is best seen for Afghanistan from the outside world.

Finally, a bold new effort to economically rehabilitate Afghanistan must be driven by a sharp increase in the aid disbursed to the central Asian country. Without widespread economic recovery across Afghanistan, all endeavours including the drive to stop the flow of narcotics are bound to fail. In the long run, there can be no sure way of changing Afghanistan’s destiny without a concerted effort to change its economic direction. Even if estimates by the UN’s drug programme suggesting that millions of dollars flow in to the hands of Islamic militants, are true, there can be no turning away from a blatant truth. That truth must be that as long as Afghanistan’s government remains vulnerable, be it due to its failure to independently secure the country, or through overseeing large scale economic rehabilitation, the central Asian state’s future must remain clouded with uncertainty.

A review of Afghanistan’s history must amply demonstrate that the only successful recent model of combating the flow of narcotics was seen while the ‘Taliban’ were in power. They were rightly condemned for the many excesses associated with their style of government. But their excesses included one of using harsh punishments against opium growers and narcotics traffickers. Perhaps there’s at least one lesson to be revisited from the legacy of an otherwise condemned regime.