We have changed course, as we should have had. It is wrong
to aver that Pakistan had any ‘Kashmir’ or ‘Afghan’
policies. Policies are formulated to achieve an objective,
a purpose. Neither of the two had an end or purpose in sight
In all countries of the
world intelligence agencies have a role to play in foreign
policy formulation; not only in terms of input, but sometimes
they even dictate foreign policy in certain domains. Two
domains, which are usually exclusively those of intelligence
agencies and in which they influence foreign policy, relate
to international terrorism and international drug smuggling.
In the US, the State Department has to calibrate policy
many times without knowing why. This is true also of Israel
where Mossad enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in relation
to ‘terrorism’ and may dictate foreign policy
without explaining why.
Apart from this, intelligence
agencies have another universally constant role: to give
input. To comprehend this it is important to understand
how intelligence agencies work. The intelligence work
has four steps: collect, collate, analyse, and interpret
or predict.
Collection is the basic
function. Intelligence agencies collect information of
all kinds, sometimes useful, sometimes not. They collect
information on any act that appears suspicious or any
act by a person who is a suspect. Collation is perhaps
the most difficult link in the entire process. It implies
establishing connections between sometimes totally unconnected
pieces of information so that they can be analysed and
then be interpreted to predict an event or interpreted
to respond to. Here are two examples.
An overseas ISI operative
reports that X, a known member of the defunct Jaish-e
Mohammed has bought a large quantity of Semtec (a very
high explosive) in Kazakhstan and has crossed over to
Afghanistan. This will come to the desk of someone in
the ‘External Wing’ of the ISI. He will promptly
convey this information to his counterpart in the ‘Internal
Wing’ and, of course, to his superiors in his own
wing. The internal wing will immediately alert their operatives
to monitor X’s movements on the Afghan border.
Meanwhile, Y, a person
suspected of having links with an extremist religious
Sunni party has been seen aimlessly roaming in Raja Bazaar
Rawalpindi and has twice circled the Imambargah in the
city. If ISI operatives spot X crossing the Afghan border,
they could have him arrested by security agencies or,
in search of bigger fish, not arrest him. In the latter
event, if someone collated these two unrelated pieces
of information, it could be analysed to conclude that
the Semtec was intended for use in Pakistan and perhaps
a possible target might be the Imambargah in Rawalpindi
city. They could then proceed to take precautionary security
measures and to proceed to try and identify the leaders
to arrest them.
We are aware that India
is active in the Central Asian countries. Someone in the
Analysis Wing of the ISI would sit down to analyse the
possibilities and would perhaps consider three: it might
be an attempt to re-link itself with Russia; it could
be an attempt to hem in China in the future; or India
wants access to the energy resources of Central Asia without
having to depend upon, or permit benefit to accrue to,
Pakistan. Consequently it is trying to ensure continued
instability in Afghanistan so that there is no alternative
but to take the lengthier route to the seas via Iran.
In the event of the first two possibilities, Pakistan
may not be seriously concerned; however, in the event
of the third possibility, the External Wing of the ISI
would be tasked to seek evidence confirming it. If confirmed,
it would have serious implications for Pakistan’s
foreign policy, which may be modified to deal with this
eventuality.
The ISI was created in
1948 as an intelligence agency intended to provide information
relevant to defence matters to all three services. It
was placed under the defence ministry. In Ayub’s
time it was tasked to gather information domestically
on political figures of significance, but no major domestic
role was assigned to it. Surprisingly, it was in Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto’s tenure that it was formally expanded
to include the Internal Wing. Surprising, because Bhutto
created the FIA intended to fill the vacuum of domestic
intelligence and in his tenure there appeared to be a
deliberate effort to eradicate the military’s influence
in politics.
However, it was in Zia’s
tenure that the ISI began to acquire the standing that
it still enjoys. Zia employed it extensively in the domestic
arena to create his ‘democratic political set-up’.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan following the Iranian
revolution brought the CIA in, and ISI was CIA’s
natural ally.
In the words of a senior
diplomat, “between 1979 and 1984 the foreign office
was slowly shifted to the ISI HQs and we were left twiddling
our thumbs or acting as spokesmen for their policies;
words of caution were to no avail”. The Afghan policy
took primacy. The US was back (relations with it had reached
an all time low when the US embassy was burned in August
1979) and helping Pakistan and the jihad by bringing in
weapons and funding. It also chose to look the other way
while Pakistan developed its nuclear capability. Consequently,
all other issues and policies were relegated to suit the
Afghan policy. Since the Afghan policy lay with the ISI,
all other policies were also influenced by it.
The Soviet withdrawal synced
with the beginning of the Kashmiri freedom movement and,
quite naturally, the ISI merely had to shift its vision
from the one front to the other, not that it was no longer
active in Afghanistan. That was to continue till the defeat
of the Taliban by the US. However, religious militancy
shifted from one front to the other and the ISI continued
to enjoy its supremacy. After the Musharraf coup (or counter
coup, as the military prefers to call it), the ISI reached
its zenith under Lt-Gen Mahmood. He considered himself
the person responsible for bringing about the coup and
therefore, specially privileged, which he was. After his
ouster, Lt-Gen Ehsan, a far more amicable and far less
aggressive person has taken over. The ISI has been purged
of elements unacceptable to the current political milieu,
Ehsan is less visible, but its influence continues relatively
unabated. It is unlikely that its influence will diminish
in the foreseeable future.
We have changed course,
as we should have had. It is wrong to aver that Pakistan
had any ‘Kashmir’ or ‘Afghan’
policies. Policies are formulated to achieve an objective,
a purpose. Neither of the two had an end or purpose in
sight; they were open-ended. They had become an end unto
themselves. Neither does it look like we still have a
policy.
In conclusion, let me offer
you a possible foreign policy statement for Pakistan today:
While recognising the dynamics of a uni-polar world and
the compulsions of following a policy of appeasement towards
the US in the interim, Pakistan will seek to re-establish
its sovereignty over the next ten years by creating a
nexus between Iran, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan utilising
the energy resources of Central Asia to gain economic
independence”. It has an aim, a purpose, a time
span and it is achievable. It can make us what we wish
to be, a sovereign state independent of external issue.
The methodology of this would complete the policy. The
methodology is a flexible outline, since it needs to adjust
to changing times. If we had something akin to this, how
different would be our dynamics today.
