The year started on a very
positive note for the two belligerent South Asian neighbours.
Cautious optimism of the previous year, paved the path
for a confident composite dialogue process. The process,
which slowly and grudgingly started after the Indian prime
minister Vajpayee's April 2003 statement, gained an increased
momentum when the seven South Asian heads of state met
in Islamabad for the 12th SAARC Summit. Islamabad made
an all out effort and was very much successful in not
only making this Summit a historic event but also effectively
using the opportunity to reinvigorate a dialogue process
with India. More than the Summit itself, all eyes were
on the meetings that took place between the Indian and
Pakistani leadership who used the SAARC venue to their
advantage and entered into one to one talks with each
other, the first opportunity for the leadership after
the failed Agra summit in July 2001. Even during the Summit,
the main focus was on reduction of tensions so to facilitate
economic cooperation and progress in the region. Not only
Pakistan and India but also the other SAARC member states
pressed this important point home that unless there is
an environment of peace and stability, the region which
comprises one fourth of world's population, would lag
behind in all respects.
The Summit provided these two nuclear-armed countries
tracking ways of constructive engagement. The February
16-18 Islamabad talks provided a modest yet important
objective of finalising modalities for the composite dialogue
process. The two countries moved beyond the somewhat tenuous
phase of 'talks for talks' and agreed upon in the January
6 statement and managed to work out the details concerning
the content, level and time framework for the dialogue.
However, the current dialogue process is not a new occurrence,
but a fourth attempt to settle mutual contentious disputes.
However, what makes this fourth round of dialogue any
different from the past efforts, is point to ponder. The
most trying time for the process and for the Pakistani
leadership came when after the state elections, instead
of Vajpayee led BJP, Congress led NDA was given a clear
mandate by the Indian public. The new government took
some time in establishing itself in the office. However,
in spite of genuine apprehensions about the future of
the process, it continued on the agenda laid out by the
BJP government. A very important factor, because for once
in the South Asian politics, the process has not been
kept hostage to actor based approach rather the emphasis
is on factor based politics, which again is indicative
of a genuine commitment to avail of the given opportunity.
For the skeptics, the dialogue process, while still continuing,
seems to be switching tracks. From the steady footed track
laid down personally by former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
and President Musharraf, now appears to be veering towards
a slippery slope. Resolving disputes may not be easy.
Other factors that have pushed the dialogue forward include
the realisation that unless New Delhi and Islamabad demonstrate
significant trust, will, determination and seriousness
in dealing with matters which cause instability, chaos,
crisis and friction in their relations, there will be
no use of a dialogue process. Second, the two sides must
understand that discussing contentious issues ranging
from Kashmir to Wuller Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek
requires a change in their official positions and formulation
of an approach which looks beyond securing parochial interests
while taking into account the need for resolving conflicts
by giving mutual concessions to each other. Also the 'close
call' in May 2002 when two nuclear powers almost headed
towards war, has ensured that the international community
'lead' the two towards the dialogue table. Solutions to
the issues including Kashmir will indeed have to be homegrown.
Both sides realised that the pre-April 2003 Kashmir Strategy
has had inherent limitations and neither country's Kashmir
policy failed to deliver, hence there is a need for a
fresh approach and a sincere dialogue process.
There is also an agreement to add new CBMs to a rapidly
increasing list. These range from not only a revival and
resumption of some previous measures, such as the revival
of the inter-ministerial Drug Committee between Pakistan
and India, resumption of meetings between the senior officials
of the Pakistan Rangers and the BSF, strengthen the existing
weekly contact between the Director-General Military operations
to a host of new issues.
In the first round, which continued throughout July and
August, resulted in preparing the basic ground work for
the issues ranging from Jammu and Kashmir to peace and
security, Siachen, Wuller Barrage, Sir Creek, trade and
commerce, cultural cooperation, terrorism and drugs. Proceeded
by a second round this November-December was to carry
the process further into not only covering the areas of
narcotics control, resumption of Munnabao-Khokrapar railway
link, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and confidence-building
measures relating to nuclear and conventional weapons,
but also to yield something concrete to commemorate the
first anniversary of the January 6th agreement.
While assessing the process objectively, it is quite clear
that the two sides have gained confidence in dealing with
issues which in the immediate past threatened an all out
war on their borders. Secondly, India and Pakistan have
passed the stage of serious tension and their relations
are much better than the post-December 2001 period. One
obvious indicator is the increased movement of civil society
groups, media and popular figures as well as a shedding
of misperceptions of the common people. A great deal of
its success owes to the very successful Cricket Diplomacy
played by the Pakistani side. A third important element
is the interest of outside world in the outcome of the
normalisation process because from their point of view
if some meaningful headway is made, at least there will
be some hope for peace in South Asia. The last but not
least is the interest involved of the people of South
Asia in general and India and Pakistan in particular in
the dialogue process and their expectations for a positive
outcome of talks because they are the ones who are the
"real sufferers" of India-Pakistan hostility.
However, so far nothing substantive has come out from
the subsequent rounds of the composite dialogue, although
the two sides in the joint communiquÈ issued after
every item of talks expressed their readiness to take
the dialogue process to its logical conclusion.
While both India and Pakistan have wisely concluded to
persevere with the dialogue, in the interest of sustainable
peace Pakistan needs to state unambiguously its expectations
from the dialogue process. Pakistan should not be impatient
about seeking a quick solution to the Kashmir dispute,
and a sudden rush on Kashmir without an appropriate system
of check and balances while examining possible solution
can create more instability than stability. The Kashmir
issue holds the key to either make or derail the entire
process. And there can be no solution to the problem unless
the will of indigenous Kashmiri population on both sides
of LOC is actively sought and the Kashmiris are made a
part of the solution than otherwise. Any cosmetic efforts
such as a seasonal troops reduction, economic uplift programmes,
or bus service etc. would yield little to the effect.
The best way to work through the problem is by building
stronger bilateral stakes in the peace process so that
neither country affords to jeopardise it at will. The
'Kashmir plus' approach, according to which the Kashmir
issue is recognised as the 'core issue' along with other
issues could provide a feasible working solution. For
the first time in many years, India and Pakistan are in
the transition phase to become normal neighbours and the
holding of composite dialogue, if sustained with good
and clear intentions, will go a long way in ushering a
new era of peace and stability in South Asia.
