Since the creation of Pakistan,
the concept of Kashmir as the lifeline of Pakistan has
remained a part of the country's official policy. Several
attempts were made by Pakistan to get Kashmir through
covert military operations, wars, diplomatic and political
efforts. But, despite all these endeavours, the Indian
controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir remained under the
tutelage of New Delhi and the concept of Kashmir as the
life line of Pakistan tends to be as elusive as it was
before. Recent efforts to resolve the Kashmir conflict
account for some optimism for peace and stability in that
conflict zone of South Asia.
At a time when India and Pakistan are in the process of
discussing contentious issues under the framework of "composite
dialogue", one needs to examine the possibility of
transforming the concept "Kashmir as the life line
of Pakistan" to "Kashmir as the line of peace."
The position taken by President Musharraf that Pakistan
can set aside the UN Security Council resolutions for
resolving the Kashmir conflict provided New Delhi also
shows flexibility on that issue also proves the erosion
of the concept "Kashmir as the life line of Pakistan".
Pakistan's case about Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is legal,
logical and moral because at the time of partition it
was decided by the British Imperial Government, Congress
and Muslim League that the princely states in the Indian
sub-continent were either to join India or Pakistan on
the basis of decision of the concerned religious majority.
In that case, Jammu and Kashmir as the Muslim majority
territory was supposed to join Pakistan but on account
of historical injustices and manipulation done by the
ruler of Jammu and Kashmir with the connivance of New
Delhi and the receding British Raj that he signed the
instrument of accession in favour of India. Since then,
J&K is a source of conflict between India and Pakistan
with both countries claiming each other's controlled parts
of Jammu and Kashmir and the Kashmiris' will and opinion
not taken into account by the two sides. Pakistan's messing
up of the situation in J&K by sending armed tribal
groups to liberate Kashmir in 1948 backfired. The same
mistake was committed in 1965 when the so-called "Operation
Gibraltar", instead of banking on the support of
the people of J&K living under Indian control, sent
armed groups from Pakistan to incite local people but
without any success. An operation, which was supposed
to transform the concept of "Kashmir as the life
line of Pakistan" into reality proved to be a fiasco.
However, no lessons were learned from past debacles and
another attempt was made in 1999 to hit the underbelly
of India in J&K i e, Kargil by sending regular and
irregular Pakistan forces. However, India retaliated resulting
into the withdrawal of forces from the heights of Kargil
and Drass in July 1999. All the three attempts made by
Pakistan to gain control over the Indian J&K failed
resulting into frustration and disappointment among the
people of this country that why serious and wise efforts
were not made by their governments to get Kashmir particularly
when historically, religiously, culturally, legally and
morally J&K is more akin to Pakistan than India. It
is a sad reality but has not been accepted by the ruling
establishment of Pakistan and they still tend to think
about options to bleed India in J&K despite knowing
the bitter fact that the world has changed after September
11 and any future adventure on the part of Islamabad in
Kashmir will result into a more serious situation than
Kargil.
Three important factors in today's world question the
concept of "Kashmir as the life line of Pakistan."
These factors have not emerged over night but have evolved
as a result of a process in which successive governments
in Islamabad couldn't redeem or comprehend the fault lines
of their the Kashmir policy. First, having tasted the
injustices, discrimination and ruthlessness of the Indian
rule for more than five decades, the Muslim majority population
of J&K is disillusioned with New Delhi. But it doesn't
mean that it favours joining Pakistan. The reason for
the assertion of Kashmiri identify over the years is not
difficult to gauge. Had Pakistan dealt with the Kashmir
issue in a prudent manner and not banked on tribal and
Jihadi elements, the people of J&K wouldn't have been
skeptical about Islamabad. The manner in which these Jihadi
elements, many of whom belonged to either Pakistan, Afghanistan
or other Muslim countries behaved with Kashmiri people
in 1948, 1965 and post 1989 period, was enough to create
disillusionment among them about Pakistan. Since Islamabad
was supporting all such elements in their Jihad in the
Indian controlled J&K, Kashmiri people, including
Muslim Kashmiris, who possess a history of secular way
of life and Sufi culture, began to give second thoughts
of the possibility of joining Pakistan. For them Pakistan,
instead of a moderate Islamic country, was tilting towards
extremism and fanaticism and the Kashmiri Muslims would
not like to change masters from Hindu fanatics to Muslim
extremists. In that case, the saying that Kashmir is the
life line of Pakistan is misplaced. When Kashmiris, whether
living under the Pakistan or the Indian control would
like to seek an independent status, how can Islamabad
expect the solution of the Kashmir conflict to be in its
favour? How can New Delhi maintain a perpetual control
over J&K, when the feelings of hatred and ill-will
against India are deep rooted?
Second, it is true that because of water resources, the
importance of Jammu and Kashmir for Pakistan is enormous.
For that matter, it can be considered as the life line
of Pakistan but the reality on the ground has changed
a lot in the last 57 years. Three rivers were given to
India and three to Pakistan according to the Indus Water
Treaty of 1960. All the six rivers either emerge from
Jammu and Kashmir or pass through that region. Had J&K
been part of Pakistan, all six rivers would have been
under its control and India would then have to request
its eastern neighbour to give some water from its rivers.
Now the situation is quite different because out of the
three rivers, which Pakistan got out of the Indus Water
Treaty, India is constructing a barrage on Wuller Lake,
which gets its water from Jhelum river. More or less,
same is the case of Baghilar power project, which India
is undertaking on its controlled part of Kashmir. Pakistan
has called the Indian act as a violation of Indus Water
Treaty and talks are now going on between the two neighbours
to deal with that issue. Based on these facts, the sustenance
of the Indian control over J&K means Pakistan's failure
to seek control over the water resources, which are vital
for its economy and industrial growth.
Third, the concept of Kashmir as Pakistan's life line
is not primarily shared by the people of Sindh, Balochistan
and to some extent North Western Frontier Province (NWFP)
because for them there are other issues of vital importance
and not just Kashmir. Therefore, in a situation when within
Pakistan the feeling about J&K as the country's life
line is not entirely shared by the minority provinces,
it becomes difficult for those who propagate such a concept
to hold their position as the official position for a
long period of time. Internal conflicts in Pakistan are
such that the Kashmir thing is overshadowed and not much
importance is given, primarily in the minority provinces
as far as judging J&K critical to their survival is
concerned.
Be as it may, the best option for Pakistan is to think
about converting line of control into line of peace so
that people of Jammu and Kashmir who are suffering from
end less pain and miseries are able to better their conditions.
A peaceful and prosperous Kashmir, whether under the Pakistani
or Indian control, will act as life line for Pakistan.
A Kashmir, which is ridden under violence, instability
and chaos, will neither be in the interest or Pakistan
or India and it will cause more harm to Pakistan than
to India. Line of peace would mean a situation whereby,
there is military disengagement from both sides along
the line of control, withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani
regular forces from their controlled parts of Jammu and
Kashmir, unleashing the process of soft border and carrying
out joint projects (both India and Pakistan) for the development
and progress of J&K. Peace in J&K will ensure
peace between India and Pakistan and South Asia. But,
for that matter, both New Delhi and Islamabad must abandon
their parochial and ego-centric positions on J&K and
take qualitative measures which could help turn line of
control into line of peace.
At a time when both India and Pakistan have entered 58th
year of their independence, they should not forget the
suppressed people of Jammu and Kashmir and must reassure
them that the two would make all concerted effort in the
direction of alleviating their plight and miseries. Let's
hope, the year 2005 brings some positive change as far
as the conflict of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned.
