Islamabad and Washington
have agreed to a plan under which Pakistan will hand over
all necessary source material regarding its dealings with
Iran's nuclear program, in exchange for which the US will
not take action against the most sensitive people suspected
of involvement in the underground network which facilitated
the proliferation with Iran.
In mid-2003, a worldwide
nuclear-proliferation network based in Pakistan was unearthed,
headed by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's
nuclear program. According to a report issued by the US
Central Intelligence Agency on November 23 this year,
Khan not only sold advanced uranium-enrichment centrifuges
to Iran, he likely also sold it an actual nuclear-weapon
design, along with nuclear fuel material. The network
also apparently had dealings with North Korea and Libya.
The specific period in
which this network spread its wings is said to be from
1987 to 2003. After the exposure, Pakistan's military
government put the blame squarely on Khan, saying that
he operated the network entirely independently and without
the knowledge of the army, which oversaw Pakistan's nuclear
development program. Khan even gave a confession on national
television. However, there has been widespread skepticism,
especially in the West, that the network could have operated
without the knowledge of the generals.
Former chief of army staff
General Aslam Beg [1], who held the position from 1988
to 1991, is frequently mentioned as being pivotal in the
network, and in aiming to build an Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan
nexus to challenge US influence in the region.
However, people close to the security establishment who
spoke to Asia Times Online point out that it is somewhat
naive to point to Beg alone - if the army were involved
in the network, it would most likely be on a much more
institutionalized basis. Certainly, the army is known
to have helped organize trips for Khan and a number of
his scientists to Iran.
But whereas before the
US might have been interested in tracking the nature of
the Pakistan army's involvement in proliferation - with
potentially explosive consequences for Washington's key
ally in the "war on terror" - the focus has
now been narrowed to find evidence that Iran is indeed
pursuing a nuclear arms program. Islamabad is lending
its weight to this initiative, and is prepared to ask
Khan, who is under house arrest, some hard questions.
Against this backdrop,
Fact spoke by telephone to Aslam Beg in Rawalpindi, the
twin capital of Islamabad where army headquarters are
housed.
A: Some top US think-tanks
believe you had a role in nuclear proliferation. What
are your comments?
Beg: When I was chief of
army staff, Pakistan made great progress towards developing
its atomic program and delivery system, my role was restricted
to that only.
A: Some people say you
were involved in selling nuclear programs to countries
such as Iran.
Beg: This is absolutely
wrong and a baseless allegation. I tell you, had these
allegations been true the US would not have spared me.
because it has a grudge against me as I always took a
stance against US designs in the region.
A: But Pakistan's nuclear
program was developed under the Pakistani army. How could
an individual like Khan manage to work independently and
continue to do so for at least 16 years?
Beg: Dr A Q Khan was given
special status and power. We all trusted in him and gave
him a free hand to develop Pakistan's nuclear program.
We had no idea that he would misuse his powers.
A: Are you satisfied with Pakistan's handling of the nuclear
proliferation issue?
Beg: Absolutely. Pakistan
has identified the people involved in the network. Dr
A Q Khan confessed his involvement. Now we have solicited
the US to stay away from Dr Khan and let us handle interrogation
matters.
A: The way Pakistan exposed
its own people to the international community, would it
not threaten Pakistan's nuclear program?
Beg: They had been exposed
anyway and we did not have any other way out. I agreed
in principle with [President General Pervez] Musharraf's
handling of the issue. Now we will help catch the whole
network and there will be no threat to Pakistan's nuclear
program. They were only rumors that after Pakistan's scientists
had been exposed in nuclear proliferation, Pakistan's
program would be capped or rolled back. It is not possible
in the regional context, where India is a nuclear power
and we possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent, that Pakistan
would alone be forced to roll back or cap its nuclear
program.
A: Was a better strategy
possible? Was it necessary to disgrace Dr Khan before
the nation?
Beg: Yes, it could have
been done more politely, but I tell you the whole episode
was inevitable because the person [Khan] was involved
[in proliferation].
Note
[1] General Mirza Aslam Beg was vice chief of army staff
in General Zia ul-Haq's military administration, and after
Zia's death in a plane crash he was immediately made chief
in August 1988. He was born in Azam Garh, British India.
Zia's son and the incumbent federal minister of religious
affairs have blamed Beg in the press for being behind
the crash, the cause of which was never officially established.
After Zia's death, Beg
helped Pakistan to a peaceful transition of power through
general elections after which the Pakistan People's Party's
(PPP's) Benazir Bhutto became premier. In the meantime,
Beg's then director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence,
Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, and Beg were accused of
gathering all right-wing parties under the umbrella of
the Islamic Democratic Alliance against the PPP.
Beg remained a powerful
chief of army staff until 1991, a period in which Pakistan
developed nuclear weapons.
After his retirement Beg
remained a controversial figure, both for his alleged
role in a bank scandal and the nuclear proliferation issue.
He founded the think-tank Friends and the non-political
Awami Qaiyadat Party (National Leadership Party) and continued
to be a powerful part of Pakistan's ruling oligarchs.
President General Pervez
Musharraf served under bith Beg and Gul, and apparently
had high respect for them, but after September 11, 2001,
they gradually drifted apart. Their differences surfaced
for the first time when in a press conference Musharraf
spoke about the negative role of a few generals and called
them "pseudo-intellectuals".
Beg raised a storm in 1991
when he publicly refused to send troops to the Persian
Gulf (troops were sent later, but only to be deployed
for the safeguard of holy places in Saudi Arabia) to take
part in the action against Iraq. This, for the first time,
strained relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
