President General Pervez Musharraf touched
base with President George W Bush last Saturday. The meeting
follows the latter’s return to office and the former’s
resolve not to doff the uniform after December 31, 2004.
Mr Bush will remain in office till 2008 and General Musharraf
would like to be still president when the next general
elections are held in Pakistan in 2007. A lot will doubtless
happen in Pakistan before that but for any Pakistani leader
to rule in Pakistan external support is traditionally
a crucial factor. Hence the meeting was an important sign
of what lies ahead. The agendas the two leaders discussed
assume that policies decided upon between them would be
carried forward. Mr Bush did not emphasise too much the
need for Pakistan to become fully democratic and General
Musharraf did not say if he felt bad about what his host
was doing in Iraq.
There was leeway for bringing in the Palestine
issue. When General Musharraf said that the Palestinian
state should be allowed to come into being as a solution
to the Middle East crisis, his host simply repeated his
stance on the creation of a Palestinian state. When, talking
to the press, General Musharraf tried to link the Palestine
issue with the “core issue” of global terrorism,
a White House “explanation” stated that the
two issues were not linked during the meeting between
the two presidents. Of course, the two presidents exploited
the theme of terrorism to their advantage. Mr Bush said
Pakistan was playing a great role against Al Qaeda and
he was completely satisfied with what General Musharraf
had done so far.
The Al Qaeda has been a bit of a problem
between Islamabad and the American military commands in
Afghanistan. So has been the question of South Waziristan.
The rumour that Pakistan had downgraded its Wana Operation
was waved aside by Mr Bush. He did not comment on the
possible location of Osama bin Laden either, although
Kabul has been speculating that he could be either in
Azad Kashmir or in Karachi. If Washington kept its side
of the roster of demands under wraps, Pakistan, too, is
supposed to have decided not to make public its latest
plaints on the conduct of India in the composite dialogue.
Mr Musharraf said he had raised the question of F16 aircraft
— 25 of them that he needs at $25 million apiece
— but a US official said there was nothing to report
on the issue, which means whatever you may make of it.
Both presidents did, however, discuss
bilateral trade. Pakistan wants more access to US markets
and General Musharraf may rightly assume that his special
equation with his counterpart should be able to pry open
a market that has clammed up because of the bad news that
doesn’t stop coming out of Pakistan, thanks mainly
to a couple of alarmist newspapers in the United States.
Pakistan was doing well in terms of its improved levels
of exports till the fag-end of the year 2004 when the
skyrocketing costs of oil imports tended to nullify the
export gains. From July to November the trade deficit
grew four times over, mainly because of the hike in the
price of oil. This means that Pakistan will need to export
more to make up for the deficit now feeding into the country’s
inflation rate.
There is a bipartisan foundation to what
the American president has to do to prop up Pakistan.
Bill S2845 under the section “United States commitment
to the future of Pakistan” desires that the “United
States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure
a promising, stable, and secure future for Pakistan.”
The bill is at present in the House of Representative.
It wants “to encourage and enable Pakistan to continue
and improve upon its commitment to combating extremists;
to seek to resolve any outstanding difficulties with its
neighbours and other countries in its region; to continue
to make efforts to fully control its territory and borders;
to progress towards becoming a more effective and participatory
democracy; to participate more vigorously in the global
marketplace and to continue to modernise its economy;
to take all necessary steps to halt the spread of weapons
of mass destruction; to continue to reform its education
system; and to, in other ways, implement a general strategy
of moderation.”
The bill, representing the enactment of
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, stipulates
that “not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit
to Congress a detailed proposed strategy for the future,
long-term engagement of the United States with Pakistan.
The strategy required by this subsection may contain a
classified annex”. When it comes to democracy and
non-proliferation, Mr Bush would be hard pressed to enunciate
a clear enough policy to satisfy his Congress. But equally,
General Musharraf may be hard pressed to stick to the
aims and objectives outlined therein.