The stage for escalated,
and possibly extraordinary, violence has been set in Balochistan.
Addressing the media at Turbat in the province on December
16, 2004, President Pervez Musharraf declared that his
Government would crush all anti-Pakistan movements: "We
are gathering information through intelligence and other
sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn
them because when the Government starts action against
them, they will be crushed."
This declaration of intent only completes what has been
on the cards, at least since 31st March 2004, when the
General had declared on the Pakistan Television (PTV)
"Newsnight" program, that the problem with Balochistan
was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while
95 per cent was 'B', where the police did not operate.
Soon, he had stated, the entire 95 per cent 'B area' would
be made into 'A area'. Already, he disclosed further,
five districts in the 'B area' had been declared 'A area'.
[The British colonial administration divided Balochistan
into A and B Areas: the former were under direct British
control and administration; in the latter, the British
exercised proxy control through the Sardars or tribal
chiefs. The system was continued after Independence by
the Pakistan Establishment.]
With its vast potential for a wide range of natural resources,
including oil, uranium, copper and other minerals, its
critical strategic location - it commands over 900 miles
of the Arabian Sea coastline, and the development, particularly,
of the Gwadar Port with massive Chinese financial and
technical assistance, 'stabilizing' Balochistan and consolidating
Islamabad's administrative hold over the province is emerging
as an overarching objective of the present regime.
These objectives militate directly both against the long-standing
system of near autonomy most of the province has enjoyed
since and even before the creation of Pakistan, and against
a number of critical demands consistently held by the
Baloch people and leadership. Specifically, the Baloch
Ittehad (Baloch Unity) movement seeks, among a range of
other objectives, to bring an end to the exploitation
of Baloch resources by Islamabad, particularly by North
Punjab; to secure fair royalties for Baloch gas; to secure
employment for locals in projects being executed in Baloch
areas; and to ensure that revenues from various projects
in Balochistan are invested in the province itself.
More significantly, the Baloch have long and bitter memories
of Islamabad's repression and betrayal over the past,
and there is great venom against the 'Punjabis' in the
Baloch discourse. In the 1950s, after an unsuccessful
insurrection, Pakistan offered a General Amnesty to the
rebels, but when their leaders came out they were hanged.
This betrayal weighs heavily in the consciousness of the
Baloch, as does the brutality with which the rebellion
of the 1970s was suppressed, with indiscriminate use of
superior firepower - including air power - against Baloch
camps and villages in which thousands were killed.
But the current sentiment goes well beyond the bitterness
of historical memories to a fear of an existential threat,
as Islamabad unfolds its plans to transform the very character
of all of Balochistan. The military regime has reportedly
decided to replace the Levies (the local enforcement apparatus)
and to provide full powers to the police to control law
and order. This would bring 25 districts of Balochistan
into province-wide policing, and do away with the traditional
institution of Levies, which are manned substantially
by the locals. The Federal Interior Ministry is reported
to have finalized a Rupees 9.6 billion security plan under
which the 'B areas' would be converted into 'A areas'
under this scheme, and for which 9,866 personnel would
be recruited.
Changing the structure of policing in Balochistan is central
to a deeper re-engineering of the entire power structure
in Balochistan. Many of the tribes have already been bought
over or neutralized and it is only among a few dominant
tribes such as the Bugtis and the Maris that an independent
power base survives.
The Pakistan Establishment has systematically diluted
the traditional system of working through the Sardars,
because the local leadership is no longer trusted. The
Sardars, in turn, jealously guard their socio-political
and financial control in the regions, and seek to 'keep
the destiny of Balochistan in their own hands'. Each of
Islamabad's new experiments at social engineering is,
consequently, deeply resented, as is the increasing dominance
of the 'Punjabis' in Islamabad.
Clearly, the Sardars now realize that Musharraf has confronted
them with a 'do-or-die' choice. If the General succeeds
in transforming all of Balochistan into 'A areas', the
power of the Sardars will have ended. The current struggle
is, consequently, quite different from the insurrections
of the 1950s and the 1970s. The Sardars, in the present
instance, are completely united. Earlier movements had
individual tribes rebelling, and these were individually
targeted in concentrated areas in the mountains into which
they escaped.
The current and mounting insurgency is radically different.
Presently, a majority of Balochistan is covered, and almost
all tribes have been united in their opposition to Islamabad
in the enveloping Baloch Ittehad The political leadership
of the Ittehad comprises Khair Buksh Marri, Akbar Bugti,
Attaullah Mengal, Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo.
Marri rejects the Parliamentary system, and is more prone
to 'direct action'. Bugti leads a political party - the
Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), but also retains armed cadres.
Mengal has adopted the path of political protest and mobilization,
and is the Chairman of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations
Movement (PONAM). Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo are leaders
of the National Party (NP).
While Marri, Bugti and Mengal are Sardars, Baloch and
Bizenjo come from ordinary middle class backgrounds. All
have come together in a loosely cooperative structure
under the banner of the Ittehad This present movement,
consequently, is an inclusive movement representing wide
Balochi interests, not just the Sardars and there has
been increasing popular consciousness of exploitation
among the common Baloch, which now transcends elite interest
groups.
This has translated into a calibrated and widely dispersed
campaign of attacks virtually across the length and breadth
of Balochistan. Total casualties have, however, remained
relatively small - given the South Asia context - with
some 94 dead and 303 wounded in the current year (till
December 14). However, vital installations and state actors
have been repeatedly targeted and the strife in Balochistan
is emerging as a critical internal security problem for
Islamabad.
The most alarming aspect of this crisis, from Islamabad's
perspective, is the sheer spatial and temporal distribution
of attacks on the Army and security forces, vital installations
and sporadic skirmishes. These have been reported throughout
the year from north-central Balochistan (Kohlu and Dera
Bugti), the capital Quetta (also the hub of sectarian
terrorism) in the west, and Gwadar, Kech, and Khuzdar
in the south. Encounters between the troops and 'Baloch
nationalists' have been on the upswing since the middle
of 2004 and furthermore, increased army presence ('protective
deployment' according to military regime spokesperson
Major General Shaukat Sultan) has led to high-profile
targets like Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf falling
under the compass of violence.
Nevertheless, the pattern of insurgent violence thus far
suggests that the Balochis are essentially demonstrating
their capabilities, rather than using them to the fullest.
Hence, the low fatality levels, uncommon for violence-wrecked
South Asia. Actions are being calibrated to a threshold
that keeps the movement alive, while a fuller commitment
is kept at abeyance till clearer assurance of support
is secured from one or another external power. It is significant,
in this context, to note that, though fatalities have
been kept low, rocket attacks and improvised explosive
device explosions have been an almost daily affair throughout
2004. In May 2004 alone, for instance, approximately 140
rocket attacks were recorded, targeting the gas pipelines
in Sui, while some 120 rocket attacks were reported in
June.
The insurgency has gradually spread across the whole of
Balochistan, and is not concentrated in any one sector.
Strikingly, there is no locus of command either, and the
Balochis, wiser for their experience in the 1970s, appear
to have ensured that their movement will not easily be
'decapitated'. A deeper scrutiny of the insurgency also
reveals that no single leader is central to its survival,
and there are indications derived from operational patterns
that suggest that the movement has, in fact, been dispersed
down to the level of cells comprising 2 to 10 persons.
Widening the strategic depth of the insurgency, the Baloch
have sought to exploit the situation prevailing in Waziristan
as well. Insurgents from the tribal belt have reportedly
begun crossing into the mountain ranges of Balochistan.
Tarique Niazi notes that, "they seamlessly melt into
the latter's capital city, Quetta, which houses predominantly
Pakhtun population, alongside the burgeoning demographic
growth of Baluchs on its skirts."
However, the current insurgent activities are like warning
shots fired over the bow, not an open insurgency as yet.
While it is true that grievances which form necessary
conditions for an insurgency are a reality in Balochistan,
they have not been adequate enough, thus far, to trigger
a major conflagration. Most violence is 'nationalist'
and there is no co-operation between Islamists in the
North and the Balochs, and there is little love lost between
the Mullahs and the Sardars.
Fortunately for Islamabad, though the Balochis are devout,
they are not fundamentalist. Indeed, efforts by the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to consolidate the influence of the
Mullahs in Balochistan is seen as a direct threat to the
power and influence of the Sardars.
The crisis has acquired additional urgency as a result
of a multiplicity of 'externalities' linked to the strategic
location and natural resources of the province. Chinese
involvement is clearly growing in Balochistan, and as
the region becomes increasingly important, its security
dimensions cannot be neglected. Gwadar is, in fact, being
projected as a major economic hub in the region, facilitating
imports and exports between Pakistan and China. While
negotiations are currently underway for investment and
collaboration in coal-fired power generation, Prime Minister
Shaukat Aziz during his visit to China from December 14
to 18, 2004, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for
the expansion of Gwadar seaport channel capacity for facilitating
large vessels.
Further, China is to continue work on the Rupees 16 billion
Saindak Project as Pakistan has reportedly expressed its
willingness to extend the lease of Saindak copper-gold
mines in Balochistan for another 20 years. Crucially,
the Gwadar Port is part of China's long-term strategy
to consolidate its strategic presence in the region, and
its maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf. The security
of these and a widening spectrum of projects for 'economic
cooperation' in the province is, consequently, pivotal,
and it is believed that China has made it amply clear
to Islamabad that a repeat of the incident of May 3, 2004,
at Gwadar Port, in which three Chinese engineers lost
their lives, would be 'unacceptable'.
US interests in the province are also increasing. While
the Government has sought to dispel notions that the US
may be permitted to locate military bases in Balochistan,
analysts point out that the US military has, for long,
targeted the development of a base near Dalbandin and
Pasni, 180 miles west of Karachi, close to the Gwadar
Port. A further deepening of Pakistan's relations with
the United States, including plausible base access, are
to a certain extent co-terminus with the plans underway
to consolidate the Army's control over Balochistan, which
could project 'strategic depth' into Central Asia and
the Gulf region.
Another, albeit ambivalent, externality relates to Iran's
interest in Balochistan. Iran's population includes about
two per cent of Baloch, who nevertheless dominate or have
very significant presence in the Zahedan , Khorasan, Seistan
and Balochistan (Iran). The Baloch are Sunnis, and Baloch
separatism - and the unity of the Baloch across the Iran-Pakistan
border - is seen as a threat by Teheran as well.
Indeed, at the height of the suppression of the Baloch
movement in Pakistan in the 1970s, US-supplied Iranian
combat helicopters, at least some of them manned by Iranian
pilots, had joined the Pakistan Air Force in its strafing
and bombing of Baloch camps and villages. At other times,
Iran's general hostility to predominantly Sunni Pakistan,
and its involvement in the sectarian conflict within Pakistan,
has tempted it to support the Balochis. Currently, however,
there is no evidence of such support.
Other complexities also color the situation in Balochistan.
At least one of these involves an internal clash of interests
in US policy. While the US is broadly committed to the
general 'stabilization' of Pakistan, it does have a vested
interest in delaying projects that would establish a dominant
Chinese strategic presence in the region, particularly
the Port of Gwadar. There would, consequently, be some
US interest in persistent, though low grade, violence
in the province.
The cumulative force of these considerations, however,
is that the Islamabad now places the highest priority
on the 'pacification' of Balochistan. Given his temperament,
Musharraf's first inclination is to crack down. By nature
an impatient man, he would seek to cement Islamabad's
dominion in the province during his own tenure, and his
decisions would be based more on his assessment of how
necessary tranquility in the region is for Pakistan's
economic and strategic interests, and not on objective
assessments of the Baloch insurgency.
The primary response, consequently, has been military.
In October this year, Lieutenant General Hamid Rab Nawaz
was handpicked to head the 12 Corps based at Quetta, which
is in charge of the Baloch Operations. Nawaz, a Punjabi
from Chakwal and, like Musharraf, a Commando, shares Musharraf's
belief structures and orientation, and is believed to
have been sent specifically to Quetta to 'take care' of
the situation. The 12 Corps comprises two divisions, the
33rd and the 41st, both headquartered at Quetta, but currently
projected in 'protective deployments' across the province.
In addition, the Frontier Corps (FC) - a paramilitary
force - has its units present all over Balochistan.
The FC is officered and overwhelming manned by non-Balochis,
and is deeply resented, with most recent rebel rocket
attacks targeting its personnel. There has, till now,
been no additional allocation of Forces to Balochistan,
though available evidence suggests that counter-insurgency
operations are being carried out in wide areas of the
province, including in Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Gwadar, Turbat
and Makran.
There is, however, a danger here that Islamabad may well
be biting off more than it can chew. In November 2003,
in what was possibly a moment of braggadocio, Musharraf
had declared that only five per cent of Balochistan was
a 'trouble spot' and that he would 'straighten out' the
trouble-making Baloch leaders. This is clearly a misreading
of the situation on the ground, and while the present
Force deployment may be sufficient to 'contain' the violence
at existing levels, particularly given the present proclivities
of the rebels themselves, it is far from adequate to secure
the radical structural transformations that Musharraf
appears to be committed to, and to suppress the natural
local responses these can be expected to provoke in an
entrenched, deeply traditional and historically hostile
society.
The troubles in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA) have already stretched Islamabad's Forces, with
over 70,000 troops stationed in South Waziristan alone.
Additional commitments in Balochistan would demand a dramatic
redrafting of national strategies, and it appears that
the military regime has not, in fact, visualized the deployments
that would be required in a rapidly worsening internal
security scenario in Balochistan.
Crucially, Balochistan's unforgiving terrain would not
yield to marginal increments in deployment. Topography
provides undetectable gateways to the Baloch on both sides
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Some areas of Afghanistan
(Nemroz, Helmand and Farah) also have significant Baloch
population, and historically these have constituted safe
areas for rebels during earlier uprisings.
More significantly, harshness of the terrain and the sheer
expanses of the province - 347,641 square kilometers,
nearly 43 per cent of Pakistan's total area - are such
that, in conventional counter-insurgency operations, virtually
the whole of the Pakistan Army could sink into the province
without being able to establish full control. Sir Charles
Napier once remarked that Balochistan was "the place
where God threw the rubbish when He made the world."
Selig Harrison in his authoritative work, In Afghanistan's
Shadow, notes that "getting from one of these valleys
to the next on foot can be a precarious business: there
are few passes, and many of them are not negotiable even
by local donkeys accustomed to the jagged terrain."
But for the Baloch, according to a 16th century war ballad,
he adds, "the lofty heights are our comrades... the
pathless gorges our friends." With an insurgency
dispersed across the whole geographical area of Balochistan,
it will be impossible to repeat the successes of the 1970s,
when small locations in the mountains where particular
rebellious tribes had fled were targeted with overwhelming
force.
Further, vast areas of Balochistan can easily be cut off
from the rest of Pakistan and there are just two routes
from provincial capital Quetta to Karachi, both of which
can be disrupted or interdicted. The evidence of earlier
Baloch rebellions indicates that the Baloch knows and
can live off the terrain, is a hardy fighter, virtually
'born with weapons', and makes a formidable adversary.
There is, moreover, no shortage of weapons among the rebels.
These can easily be purchased from the Afghan surplus,
both within Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Wide and relatively
indiscriminate state violence will be necessary if the
Baloch are to be 'crushed' once again.
Such violence is, of course, not beyond Islamabad's capacities.
The insurrections of the 1950s and 1960s were, in fact,
suppressed through unrestrained violence, with air power
widely used to strafe and destroy civilian concentrations.
Musharraf himself may, also, not be particularly averse
to such extreme measures - he had, after all, earned himself
the sobriquet of the 'Butcher of Baltistan' during his
campaigns as a Brigadier in the Northern Areas.
It is questionable, however, whether such state repression
would be sustainable within the current international
context - despite the extraordinary indulgences the 'international
community', and particularly the US, has inclined to extend
to this persistent offender against international standards.
Pakistan appears, currently, to be preparing grounds to
justify extreme use of force in the province, planting
reports that Osama bin Laden may be in Balochistan and
that some Al Qaeda leaders, who were discovered in Iran,
had escaped to that country through Balochistan. The presence
of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements (essentially supported
by the Pashtuns in the North Balochistan areas) is being
projected in order to justify action against wider Baloch
targets further South.
Some diversionary 'political initiatives' have, however,
also been announced to manage the dissent in Balochistan.
The most significant of these was the appointment during
Shujaat Hussain's brief tenure as Prime Minister, of a
Parliamentary Committee comprising two sub-committees,
one to look into the problems in Balochistan, and the
other to examine the question of 'Provincial Autonomy'.
The former was headed by Mushahid Hussain, who has since
made more than one visit to Balochistan and has met all
the chieftains.
The Balochistan Sub-Committee's report is to be submitted
on January 7, 2005. The Provincial Autonomy sub-committee,
which has only met a couple of times, has seen little
movement. These committees essentially constitute a classical
South Asian tactic that relies on delay to diffuse political
crises. Given the circumstances in Balochistan, it is
improbable that such stratagem will significantly influence
the larger course of events.
The military crackdown in Balochistan is clearly slated
for intensification. The operations against the jirgas
in Waziristan have already demonstrated that no one can
be exempt from punitive action if Islamabad's authority
is challenged, and that Musharraf believes that there
are certain areas of Pakistan that have to be 'quietened'
in the immediate future. With the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) relatively secured, it is now Balochistan's
turn.
Other events that may propel such action beyond a 'turning
point' would include an act of major sabotage at Gwadar;
a major disruption of the gas pipeline; or the linking
up of Baloch forces across international borders. Even
absent such extreme provocation, the province appears
to be headed for an extended period of bloody violence
that may well have defining consequences for the future
of Pakistan itself.
The writer is a Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict
Management and Assistant Editor, Faultlines. This article
was published in the South Asia Intelligence Review