What
is Mr Khar up to?
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By Adnan Adil
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Ghulam
Mustafa Khar's recent proposal implies that he wants
the politicians to accept Musharraf as a president
in military uniform and his constitutional amendments
-- herein lies the crux of the issue
Ghulam
Mustafa Khar cannot be kept out of the political
arena for long. He has a style just the opposite
of the manner in which Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan,
another famous politician from Muzaffargarh, conducted
his politics. |
While
the Nawabzada remained constantly active leading one opposition
alliance after another, Khar waits for the right moment
to strike; and if the move fails, he silently retires
to his farms.
Mustafa Khar did not take part in 2002 elections, since
he could not fulfil the criteria of candidature. Last
month, he came out of his hibernation -- and with a bang.
He suggested a so-called formula in which the army generals
and the politicians, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in
particular, were asked to make an arrangement among themselves
to share power for the next ten years. Before
presenting his so-called compromise formula, Khar went
to Britain where he met PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto
and PML-N president Shahbaz Sharif. Makhdoom Amin Faheem
was also present during his meeting with Benazir. Khar
also appeared in a popular private television programme
in which he recounted just how loyal he was to Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto. By evoking ZAB's memories among his ardent
supporters, he tried to create a soft corner for himself
among PPP workers who identify themselves more with
ZAB than his party as it exists today.
On November 16, Mustafa
Khar addressed newsmen at Lahore Press Club and outlined
his proposal about how the army and the political parties
could end their differences. They must share power for
the sake of, what he described as political stability,
and to avert a clash between the people and the army.
What was new in Khar's
suggestions was his demand of Gen. Pervez Musharraf
to grant general amnesty to all political leaders and
the release of imprisoned political leaders and workers
including Asif Zardari and Javed Hashmi. He also called
on Gen Musharraf to allow Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto
to come to their country and play their roles in national
politics.
As to what Sharif and
Benazir should, in turn, offer to Gen Musharraf to make
the deal possible, Khar left it vague. However, his
insistence that political parties and the army should
share power for the next ten years implies that he wants
these politicians to accept Musharraf as a president
in military uniform and his constitutional amendments.
Herein lies the crux of the issue.
Khar's proposals for
national reconciliation came at a time when the six-party
alliance, the MMA, and the government were not able
to conclude a compromise on the controversial constitutional
amendments package. As the statements of the two parties
suggest, they had agreed on an amended version of the
LFO. But this could not be presented in the parliament
due to an unresolved point -- the MMA wanted Gen Musharraf
to give a written assurance that he would abandon his
military chief's position by December 2004 while the
latter wanted this to be a tacit understanding between
the two.
Mustafa Khar's suggestions
meant that the MMA would go into the background and
the main political parties would strike a deal with
the military. No wonder that the strongest criticism
to Mustafa Khar's formula came from the MMA's central
leader Hafiz Hussain Ahmad who said that the alliance
would not allow Khar another political marriage -- alluding
to his several marriages and a flip flop political career.
Hafiz Hussain also said that Khar has been brought to
sabotage the opposition's movement.
As expected, the PPP
local leadership also reacted strongly to Khar's suggestions.
One of them was PPP Punjab president Qasim Zia who said
Khar was not part of the PPP. Makhdoom Amin Faheem also
issued a statement saying that Khar's formula was a
figment of his imagination and might have been put together
to advance his political ambitions.
Strangely, Benazir Bhutto
did not issue a single statement on Khar's suggestions.
Instead, in a fresh interview, she said that she was
close to striking a compromise with Gen. Musharraf but
the hardliners in the latter camp did not allow this
to happen. This could be read as her inclination towards
a compromise with the military regime or at least that
she did not disapprove of a deal with Musharraf regime.
Later, Asif Zardari while
talking to journalists on the occasion of his hearing
in a court made a three-point statement. One, the army
and the politicians should play their roles. Two, he
said, Khar's formula meant that the army should withdraw
from politics in an honourable way (which means without
facing a public agitation or movement.) Three, the institutions
instead of quarrelling with each other, should develop
a working relationship with each other. Thus, Zardari,
using a slightly different formulation, repeated what
Khar had suggested.
Khar's timing is important
because after Nasrullah Khan's death, the alliance between
the PPPP and the PML-N has weakened. The two could not
even agree to a single name for heading the alliance
and resolved the dispute by sharing the top position
by creating two offices for their united front. In Nasrullah's
absence it is harder for Benazir to find someone who
is there for her, without threatening to steal her party
-- thus the need for her to be present in the country
is greater than ever. The timing of Khar's move for
a national reconciliation is viewed in this background.
On the other hand, Gen
Musharraf also needs political allies to move on the
foreign policy front. It is not easy for him to strike
a deal with the religious parties who are strongly opposed
to his policies on Afghanistan and Iraq. The US is pressing
Pakistan to send its peace-keepers to Iraq. Gen Musharraf
has delayed the decision in this regard and cannot take
this step without the support of some major political
group.
The People's Party is
the only party that has so far fully supported Musharraf's
policies of co-operation with the US in its war against
terror. Benazir has also welcomed Musharraf's recent
moves to normalise ties with India by offering CBMs.
Thus, a political deal between the PPP and Musharraf
could be beneficial for both. Khar's efforts are geared
in this direction.
It seems the establishment
may agree to the release of Asif Zardari from jail.
After spending seven years in prison Zardari has become
a kind of liability for the establishment. Some also
speculate that his increased popularity among Sindhis
will weaken Benazir Bhutto's hold on interior Sindh's
politics and thus may benefit the establishment.
But the main point on
which national reconciliation rests is Gen Musharraf's
allowance to Sharif and Benazir to return home safely.
Khar's test lies in brokering this contentious issue
with success. This will also show whether the establishment
has launched Mustafa Khar to buy still more time and
diffuse the opposition's plans for a public movement
(as it has done in the past) or this time it is serious
in concluding some agreement with the opposition parties.
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