A meaningful change requires
addressing three issues. One, what are the terms for accommodation
between the president and the mainstream political parties?
Two, will Musharraf be willing to loosen his grip on the
political process? Three, should there be early elections
and how will the fairness of the electoral process be
ensured?
The acting president’s
decision to sign the bill entitling the president to hold
two offices has caused dismay and generated controversy.
Several legal experts are of the view that while an acting
president can perform routine functions of the office
the signing of the bill does not fall in that category.
Had the bill lapsed for want of presidential assent the
acting president could not be blamed for it. It was sent
to President General Pervez Musharraf who could sign it
into law or return it to the parliament for reconsideration.
The Law Ministry must have taken up the subject with the
presidency before the president left for his foreign visit.
If he did not sign the bill it must have been deliberate.
Could it be that Musharraf and his advisers thought the
bill should be signed by the civilian acting president?
Having a civilian sign
the bill into law fits nicely with Musharraf’s approach
towards the uniform issue. He had consented in the last
week of December 2003 to give up the office of army chief
as a part of the deal with the MMA for the Legal Framework
Order to be legitimised. The cabinet members belonging
to the Pakistan People’s Party Patriots then initiated
the idea of his keeping the office beyond the designated
date. Subsequently, other cabinet members and the senior
members of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) supported the
idea. The provincial assemblies of the Punjab and Sindh
passed resolutions asking the president to stay on as
the army chief. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and his cabinet,
too, endorsed the resolutions the federal government moved
the bill in the National Assembly to enable him to keep
the two offices.
Throughout this process,
President Pervez Musharraf avoided taking a definite position
on the question of staying on as the army chief after
December 31, 2004. However, there are three statements
by him that mention the uniform issue. He said in an interview
on September 6 that 96 percent people wanted him to stay
on as the army chief. On September 10, he made an interesting
remark on this issue. He said. “It is a public perception
that my power lies in my uniform and this perception should
remain in the interest of Pakistan.” In an interview
with Washington Post on September 17, he said that “a
vast majority” of Pakistanis wanted him to carry
on as the army chief.
There is no statement so
far by President Musharraf suggesting that he wants to
stay on as the army chief. Whenever the media people have
raised this issue he has replied that he would decide
about the matter at the appropriate time. One can justifiably
argue that the Patriots, the PML leaders and the federal
cabinet — as well as the two provincial assemblies
— would not have pursued the matter without the
president’s blessings. However, the fact remains
that the president has maintained a discreet distance
from these efforts. It is not surprising therefore that
Musharraf did not sign the bill and had a civilian do
this.
Musharraf can now claim
that personally he has not been involved in the passage
of the two offices bill. If he continues to combine the
two offices he can argue that he is doing so on the demand
of the civilian institutions and the elected leaders.
Should he decide to quit as the army chief it would be
a major rebuff to the co-opted civilian leaders.
The two offices legislation
episode exposes the lack of self-confidence in the co-opted
civilian leaders and institutions who seek strength by
identification with the president-army chief and the top
army brass. The campaign for the president’s two
offices was an exercise on their part to demonstrate their
loyalty to the president. If that remains the disposition
of the co-opted civilian leaders how can the parliament
and the federal cabinet shape up as the focal point of
the political system.
To demonstrate their clout
in the polity, the co-opted civilian leaders proudly talk
of their connections with the presidency, senior commanders
of the military (especially the army), the ISI and the
MI. Given the state of affairs, the military is bound
to overwhelm the state and society, may be even develop
an over-confidence in its ability to manipulate the civilian
institutions and leaders.
Political parties and leaders
in the opposition are challenging the dependence of the
civilian institutions and leaders on the military. However,
their differences with one another adversely affect their
capacity to build pressure on the military-dominated political
arrangements. The major components of the opposition,
i.e. the ARD (mainly the PPPP and the PML-N), and the
MMA have openly challenged the government efforts to enable
Pervez Musharraf to continue as both president and the
army chief. Their rivalry and distrust of each other makes
it difficult for them to undertake a major onslaught on
the government.
The MMA has already started
popular mobilisation to force the president to quit his
army office by December 31, 2004. Two public meetings
held in Karachi and Multan were attended mainly by their
hardcore workers and madrassa students. There was little
spontaneous popular response. The MMA must realise that
it cannot run an effective movement against the government
by mobilising only its hardcore and the madrassa students.
While some PML-N political
leaders are inclined towards the MMA, there are sharp
ideological and political differences between the PPPP
and the MMA. It may therefore be difficult to launch a
nationwide joint agitation against the government in the
near future. Yet, the opposition movement against the
president’s two offices is likely to accentuate
the legitimacy crisis for the military-dominated political
order.
There are reports that
the presidency is quietly seeking a political deal with
the PPPP and the PML-N to enhance support for the current
political arrangements which appear to have run aground
because their support base has remained narrow. This may
be an attempt to diffuse the pressure caused by the decision
of the ARD and the MMA to undertake popular mobilisation
campaign. The MMA has started its movement and the ARD
is expected to do so this month. An on-going dialogue
can dilute the PPPP and PML-N plans, at least for the
time being, and rule out the possibility of these parties
joining hands with the MMA. That should mean enough respite
for the government to cope with the pressure that may
not last for more than a month or so. This will also show
to the MMA that the government will not always be dependent
on its support. If the mainstream parties return to the
political domain in full strength, the MMA will lose its
salience.
A meaningful change in
the current domestic political situation calls for addressing
three issues. One, what are going to be the terms and
conditions for accommodation between the president and
the mainstream political parties? Two, will Musharraf
be willing to loosen his grip on the political process?
The mainstream political parties may accept Musharraf
as president under the post-LFO arrangements but they
are not expected to support his indefinite continuation
in both offices and the overwhelming role of the military
in the state and societal institutions and processes.
Will then there be mid-term elections? This brings us
to the third question: how will the fairness of the electoral
process be ensured? There is also the question of how
the MMA and the core of the ruling coalition react to
the development? There are no ready answers.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
