Military regimes and public |
By Dr. Mehdi Hasan
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The
public opinion about the current military administration
is discernibly different from what it was in the previous
three military regimes. Soon after the first military
takeover by Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, people were generally
happy. The armed forces were respected as defenders
of our geographical boundaries in view of the tense
relationship between India and Pakistan. This was especially
true of Punjab where the criterion of patriotism was
to be an enemy of India. Any one talking of friendship
between India and Pakistan was considered to be a traitor
and an Indian agent.
When Ayub Khan assumed
the role of a politician -- after abusing politics,
politicians and political parties for about four years
-- he was supported by the traditional political opportunists.
This gave birth to Convention Muslim League -- the general's
party. Initially, the only resistance to the first martial
law came from students in Karachi. This was the time
when most of the political parties had gone into hibernation.
The resistance in Karachi forced Ayub Khan and his strategists
to shift the federal capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi,
where the GHQ was which later led to the construction
of Islamabad.
It was the agitation
by all sections of society, Fatima Jinnah's decision
to enter into practical politics and a loss of 243 lives
that forced Ayub Khan out of politics. Even after the
countrywide agitation for more than a year, general
public was reluctant to directly criticise the armed
forces; the target was Ayub Khan and the constitution
he had adopted as a politician.
Gen. Yahya Khan was acceptable
to the people because he had accepted all their demands
during the year-long agitation -- including the holding
of the first general elections on the basis of adult
franchise. However, the military junta refused to honour
the people's mandate and an unprecedented agitation
ensued in the former East Pakistan.
This culminated in a
civil war and later war with India. People in the former
eastern wing were happy, while public in the western
part was shocked and depressed about their failure.
Before they could realise that the political ambitions
of the armed forces were responsible for the debacle,
Gen. Yahya's comrades in arms made a very clever move:
they sacrificed Yahya Khan for their own safety and
political ambitions in future. People, in what remained
of Pakistan, were made to believe that the bottle of
Black Dog and about half a dozen begmaat were responsible
for the debacle.
Z.A. Bhutto was transferred
power as Yahya's colleagues wanted to save their skin
from people's wrath. Bhutto tried to restore the confidence
of the shattered nation. But, instead of building and
strengthening political institutions, he decided to
restore and revive the image of armed forces as saviours
of the nation -- only to find himself at the receiving
end only after five years.
The third martial law
came in the wake of violent agitation by the religious
parties and a visible American wrath against Bhutto
and his policies. The judiciary once again played a
key role in cementing the political power of the military
junta. One of the many collaborators of Ziaul Haq, Maj.
Gen. Rahat Latif, has recently denied Mustafa Khar's
equally recent claim that he was one of the two officers
who had physically thrashed Bhutto in jail. Many others
like him have tried to clear their names from the doings
of the most ruthless military dictator, after his removal
from the scene of course.
But more interesting
is Gen. Rahat's disclosure that the army contingent
called by the Bhutto administration to help civil administration
in Lahore to control law and order situation had refused
to open fire on civilians of their own country. One
wonders if some conscientious officers had also refused
to become a party to flog political workers, or to open
fire on their own countrymen in former East Pakistan,
or in Morro in Nawabshah district in 1983 and in Balochistan
during the Bhutto senior's government. When the PNA
components had demanded from Bhutto to end military
action in the province he asked Ziaul Haq to withdraw
forces. Ziaul Haq had refused saying that armed forces
would not like it. Bhutto had asked Ziaul Haq to convince
the PNA leaders, and Ziaul Haq made a presentation before
them. However, forces were withdrawn from Balochistan,
after the imposition of martial law.
This and a lot of other
historical evidence confirms that military establishment
was, and still is, biased against PPP and its leaders.
The difference between
the previous three military regimes and the present
Musharraf administration is in the calibre of civilian
supporters, calling themselves politicians in each case.
The slide downward in the quality of political leadership,
both among the supporters of the military rulers and
the opposition, has resulted in greater encroachment
by the armed forces in political affairs. Even the assemblies
elected on non-party basis in 1985 were qualitatively
better than the present crowd in the parliament. Mohammad
Khan Junejo, the nominee of Gen. Zia, never called the
Martial Law Administrator his boss. Complete control
of the military establishment of the civilian affairs
in the present setup even after the elections without
any efforts of resistance from the ruling alliance.
Javed Hashmi's arrest
and its defence by the ruling party has not done any
good for the armed forces which should, as a matter
of principle, remain uncontroversial. The recent statement
by the federal information minister, who is also the
official spokesman of the government, that Gen. Pervez
Musharraf should accept the office of the president
of Muslim League (Q) is just an example.
The people of Pakistan
have a right to know whether the idea has been discussed
and approved by the ruling party or it is just a gesture
showing loyalty for the General by the minister. The
idea is not a new one -- Gen. Ayub Khan was offered
the top political office of Convention Muslim League
by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman in 1962, and Ayub Khan had
obliged the politicians by accepting the offer. But
many political observers believe that Sh. Rashid Ahmad
could not make such an offer on his own.
Politics all over the
world is a controversial field. Whoever decides to indulge
in politics cannot expect to remain above criticism
and uncontroversial.
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