Pakistan's National Command Authority held its meeting on November, during which Islamabad decided to consolidate its nuclear weapons management under the control of General Pervez Musharraf. The decision deters military adventurism by Pakistan's archrival, India. The consolidation also puts Musharraf in a position of strength in terms of international bargaining and fighting off his enemies within Pakistan.

Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) held its meeting in Rawalpindi on at the Strategic Plans Division, The Nation reported. Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, who leads the NCA, chaired the meeting. During this last session, the NCA made decisions to consolidate its nuclear weapons management system.

Musharraf is reforming Pakistan's nuclear sector and command system as a strategic deterrent to India. He wants to consolidate his power in the country, which is driven by different and antagonistic forces. Musharraf needs the added strength in order to negotiate with the international community - and within his own country.

The NCA was established in February 2000 to create command and control mechanisms for Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile systems. It is responsible for policy formulation, employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. Besides Musharraf, the NCA includes foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers, chiefs of all military services and heads of strategic organizations.

Pakistan has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, at least in the near future; when a country enhances its nuclear weapons command and control system, it generally reveals the opposite. For Islamabad, nuclear weapons provide a final trump card in a possible conflict with its much bigger rival,

India has Pakistan outmanned and outgunned, both overall and in conventional forces and arms. There are approximately 980,000 active Indian troops and another 800,000 in reserve. In comparison, Pakistan has an estimated 562,000 active soldiers and 500,000 reservists. India boasts 3,600 tanks to Pakistan's 2,200, and the Indian air force maintains 890 fighting aircraft as compared to Pakistan's 620.

Pakistan has worked hard to gain the advantage in number of conventional arms. Once Pakistan achieves some success, India once again upsets Pakistan's hard-earned advantage. For example, this year has witnessed the beginning of production of Pakistan's new major battle tank, Al-Khalid. This 46 ton, three-man tank was built with Chinese help and has a maximum speed of 40 mph. With a cruising range of 250 miles, it is indeed superior to India's Arjun tank. But India signed a US$3 billion package with Russia last month, and New Delhi is building and will receive 310 of Russia's newest major battle tanks, the T-90s, which beat Al-Khalid in every parameter. The same is true of combat aircraft and naval ships.

Pakistan maintains a first-strike option in its nuclear doctrine. With India outgunning Pakistan's conventional forces at every turn, the accepted use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack sends a message to New Delhi that, despite its larger military, Pakistan is not incapable of defending itself.

Pakistan also had a nuclear advantage because its chief of the army staff had been in charge of nuclear planning and deployment, even when there was a civilian head of government. Last month, India hoped to catch up with Pakistan on the issue of nuclear planning and management by introducing a new high command structure.

Islamabad's response was to integrate all research, design, production, planning and deployment of nuclear weapons in the NCA under Musharraf's control, once again positioning itself above its archrival. India still does not have a centralized nuclear authority body such as Pakistan's NCA, and its political and military branches of power are not linked together with regard to nuclear weapons. India's civilian government executes full control over design, research and production of nuclear weapons, while the Indian military is in charge of operational control over nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's government is concerned with not only nuclear but also missile capability. Musharraf also has established a Strategic Force Command led by a serving army general responsible for deployment of strategic missiles. Pakistan possesses two versions of a medium-range nuclear-capable missile called Ghauri. Its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-11 also belong to the same class of missiles. The existing version of the Ghauri missile is operational and has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles; the ability to carry nuclear, biological and chemical warheads; and the ability to be launched from land or air. The missile is said to be equipped with an extremely accurate guidance system.

By all these parameters, the Ghauri is superior to India's medium-range missile Prithvi. It means Pakistan's missile-launching abilities are higher than those of India. Pakistan also may have tested a new version of the Ghauri with a range of up to 1,800 miles that amounts to a new class of missile - not medium range, but the so-called long-range missiles. To counter Pakistan's temporary superiority, India is actively working in two directions: first, to improve characteristics and range of its medium-range missiles, and second, to create its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 5,000 to 8,000 miles.

By further integrating and strengthening its nuclear command system under the NCA, Pakistan is trying to better position itself for future challenges in the region. The first test is probable talks with India, in which Pakistan would be able to talk from a position of strength, not weakness. The NCA will guard the work of organizations such as the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) led by Dr Qadeer Khan, who is considered the mastermind of Pakistan's nuclear program, the National Development Complex (NDC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Thus, Musharraf is reining in the very strong, nearly autonomous civilian nuclear research and development agencies. This will add to consolidation of his authority in the country as a whole and in the nuclear field in particular.

Musharraf has made himself the sole caretaker for the country's nuclear arsenal. This will make it much more difficult for someone else to use Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategic missiles without Musharraf's authorization. He faces the threat of some hardline factions within the military, Inter-Service Intelligence and radical Islamic circles whose influence in the country grows. Any of these internal threats may try to gain access to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal - either for striking India or "the enemies of Islam".

Musharraf also may have more authority and negotiation power while dealing with the United States and other Western powers. He needs it for discussing the nuclear proliferation problem and Pakistan's adherence, or non-adherence, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Musharraf can demonstrate the international community should not worry about Pakistan's non-adherence to CTBT because its nuclear weapons are now under complete control of secular- and reform-minded Musharraf.

Restructuring export control mechanisms through the NCA also means Musharraf is strengthening his control over the export of fissile materials and nuclear technology. In addition to Musharraf taking this important field under his tight control, the move is also an attempt to reverse the worsening of Pakistan-US relations. It is meant to send a positive signal to America that Pakistan is making an effort to tighten its export controls on nuclear materials and technology.

Putting everything under Musharraf's control does give him better leverage both inside and outside the country. But it also gives him little flexibility to place the responsibility on others if he is in a tight spot and blamed for Pakistan's current and likely future failures.

Also, it remains to be seen whether this full control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will be transferred from Musharraf as the top leader of Pakistan to the country's civilian supreme authorities after elections are held next year. In the status of the NCA, there is no wording on the role of the Pakistani prime minister or other top civilian authority as a future head of the NCA. Also, if another military ruler replaces Musharraf, there is no guarantee his successor would pursue the same nuclear policy.

Nevertheless, integrating all decision-making power over nuclear weapons within the NCA represents the opportunity to gain full control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Provided the military does not rebel, a future civilian government of the country would have a chance to assert its authority over the whole nuclear complex, since the NCA is not a military body