When assessing the state of Pakistan-China relations, do not use rhetoric as a yardstick. For the language of the bilateral relationship is invariably flowery and positive, with mutual praise mandatory. References to the historical friendship between China and Pakistan -- one that stretches back many decades -- come up again and again. Given this constant of positive verbal rhetoric, the only way to gauge the true state of relations is to read between the lines and look at what is not said.

That was certainly the case for President Musharraf's recent five-day trip to China. The language of bilateral relations during the trip was even more flowery than usual. The Chinese greeted Musharraf as "an old friend of the Chinese people", but he took first prize with his "deeper than the oceans, higher than the mountains" description of Pak-China friendship. Though exaggerated, such positive language was not without justification.

During his time in China the Pakistani President met all the senior Chinese leadership, including President Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Jintao's predecessor as President and current head of the commission that runs the Chinese military. Hu Jintao became President in March, so this was Musharraf's first meeting with him since he assumed his new post.

In terms of concrete outputs, the visit led to the signing of eight accords, and a joint declaration laying out the roadmap for future bilateral cooperation. The accords vary in significance, from a relatively minor accord to allow export of Pakistani mangoes to China, to the more important preferential trade agreement (for some commodities) and an extradition treaty. The latter allows each side's prisoners convicted in the other country, to serve their sentence in their native land. The ease for prisoners and their families in this arrangement is obvious. As part of efforts to expand the bilateral relationship beyond trade and military cooperation, there was an accord to promote cultural exchanges of writers and musical troupes.

Military cooperation has always been an important component of the bilateral relationship. It featured prominently in this trip too: "Pakistan and China attach great importance to the role of Pakistan-China Defence and Security Consultation in promoting military-to-military exchanges and cooperation." There were pledges to continue defence cooperation, e.g. through training of military personnel. Add to this list an MoU signed between Pakistan and South Korea (on the final leg of Musharraf's Asia tour) to explore possibilities for oil production in Pakistan, and the concrete outputs from the trip were indeed considerable.

In the post-9/11 world terrorism is never far from the agenda, and so it was in China. In his first meeting with the Pakistani President, Hu Jintao stressed that both countries must battle the 'three forces' of extremism, ethnic separatism and terrorism. Jintao's definition of the 'three forces' in this manner has much to do with the problem of Muslim-Uigur armed separatism that the Chinese government is facing in its north-western Xinjiang province. Ethnicity and religion feature large in the roots of the crisis there.

The Chinese were not discussing the situation with Pakistan in an abstract manner, simply to get Islamabad's moral support. Rather they did so because of concerns about Pakistan's role in Xinjiang. There have been allegations that Muslim separatists in the province have been getting support from Muslim sympathizers in Pakistan. The highway linking the region to Pakistan's NWFP is seen as the conduit for this support. No one is suggesting that the Pakistan government is involved in this cooperation -- if it is taking place, it is almost certainly driven by non-state actors. But the Chinese wanted (and got) the Pakistan government's commitment to tackle the 'three forces' in the Xinjiang context.

So much for what was said: what about what was not said? From the Pakistani perspective, the biggest unsaid thing was an agreement by the Chinese to build a second nuclear power plant in Pakistan. [The Chashma plant in Punjab was built with Chinese assistance.] Pakistani newspapers confidently reported as the President left for China, that an accord to this effect would be signed during the trip. It wasn't. The official explanation was that talks on the financial and technical aspects of the deal are still going on.

But unofficially, there is speculation that the Chinese could be holding back because of American and international pressure. Washington, as part of its non-proliferation drive, is unwilling to see Beijing offer more nuclear technology to Pakistan. Just as the Chinese have curbed their technology transfer to North Korea because of such pressure, they could be tempted to do the same with Pakistan. Most analysts, though, believe the deal will go ahead eventually. China's failure to sign a deal on this trip is seen as a gesture acknowledging the concerns of the international community, rather than capitulation to their demands.

The other big unspoken item on the agenda was China's blossoming relationship with India. One of the main factors driving Pak-China friendship has been their shared concern about New Delhi: Pakistan's concerns are obvious, while for China there was the issue of rivalry for regional superpower status plus the unresolved border dispute that led to the 1962 Sino-Indian war. But in recent years China's relationship with India has improved greatly, to the extent that the two countries are holding joint military exercises.

It would be an understatement to say that Pakistan views this development with alarm. Imagine: the very country from whose threat Pakistan needs China's backing, now itself cosying up to the Chinese. The Pakistanis might be alarmed, but they should not be surprised. In the 21st century, the driving factor for any country's foreign policy is increasingly its economy. China is no exception. Its relations with many countries -- not just India -- have been transformed by its desire to promote trade and economic growth. Beijing knows that in order to realise its superpower ambitions, it has to first become an economic superpower. India, with its massive middle class market, represents an excellent opportunity for Chinese exporters.

President Musharraf acknowledged the importance of China's economic transformation: "China's economic miracle of the last 20 years is a beacon for all developing countries like Pakistan." And he at least, expressed optimism that economic growth would allow China to become a superpower: "The past belongs to Europe, the present to the United States, and the future belongs to Asia." While his hosts will have been fervently hoping his prediction comes true, the Pakistanis will be hoping they will be able to share that future.

All in all, a successful Asia tour for the Pakistani president with some agreements and much positive spin. Read between the lines, though, and it is clear the bilateral relationship is adjusting to new global realities: those adjustments do not necessarily bode well for Pakistan.