The United States was trying as far back as the 1970s, when
Pakistan's nuclear programme was in its infancy, to apply
pressure on China, France, Germany, South Africa, Niger,
Canada and others to dry up the supply lines to Islamabad,
official documents reveal.
A July 14, 1977 secret
US memorandum titled "Nuclear Safeguards - Pakistan,
South Africa, China" details the steps taken by Canada,
France, Germany and Niger, on US prodding, to stop the
development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.
The memorandum said: "The
primary matter of concern with regard to Pakistan then,
is not safeguards, which seem likely to be required by
both South Africa and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany)
but the availability of fuel fabrication services.
By constraining Pakistani
access to nuclear fuel services wherever possible, pressure
can be built up to encourage Pakistan to adopt and follow
responsible nuclear non-proliferation policies, including
cancellation or indefinite deferral of its reprocessing
project."
According to the same document,
Pakistan did not seem to have an immediate need for supplies
of South African uranium because it concluded an arrangement
with Niger for the supply of uranium concentrate.
"In addition to raw
uranium yellow-cake, however, Pakistan needs fuel fabrication
services to replace assistance formerly supplied by Canada,
which terminated nuclear cooperation with Pakistan pending
agreement to apply more stringent safeguards and to cancel
the planned reprocessing plant being purchased from France,"
the secret memorandum said.
"Pakistan has also
asked the French to provide fuel fabrication services,
but the French have refused, apparently reflecting their
heightened concern about nuclear proliferation..."
the document revealed.
A 1979 document regarding
a briefing of the International Atomic Energy Agency director-general
Eklund about Pakistan's sensitive nuclear activities also
quotes a US diplomat as detailing the steps taken to starve
supplies to Pakistan's nuclear programme. "We had
been in contact with other suppliers and had met with
some success in closing off sales of centrifuge components,"
the official said.
In the same briefing, the
IAEA director-general passed on documents received by
the nuclear watchdog from Pakistan to the US and "wondered
if effective economic pressure could be exerted on Pakistanis
given their access to Muslim oil money."
Among one of the strategies
devised during the meeting, the document shows, was to
manoeuvre the "responsible countries of the world
to put enough pressure on Pakistan to stop the programme."
Cancellation of the proposed
French sale of Mirage aircraft to Pakistan and economic
pressures were discussed as possible ways to mount such
pressure. During discussions, the document shows, the
IAEA director- general said "he thought (French President)
Giscard, who had brought about several changes in French
non-proliferation policy in the past two years might agree
to pressure Pakistan."
A January 10, 1984 memorandum
from the then US assistant secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz, to deputy secretary
of state Kenneth Dam, details the reasons which led China
to give an assurance that it would not facilitate proliferation
of explosive nuclear devices.
Paul Wolfowitz, currently
deputy secretary of defence in the Bush administration,
observed in the memorandum: "Zhao intends to make
a statement on non-proliferation in his toast at the state
dinner, January 10. This statement together with the clarifications
of Chinese negotiators resolve the concern which arose
from past Chinese assistance to Pakistan."
As Pakistan was progressing
towards its attainment of nuclear deterrence, documents
show that multinational companies were reluctant to repair
some of the technical faults in the nuclear power plants
in Karachi and Islamabad, while at the same time apparently
sharing information with US operatives about their observations,
during visits for maintenance.
According to a US department
of defence document, "At Kanupp (Karachi) both turbine
and generator control instruments are badly in need of
maintenance or replacement. Because they were originally
provided by Hitachi, Pakistan sought Hitachi's help and
the later sent two technicians to have a look at the equipment."
Finally, however, because
of the potential for applications to nuclear weapons production,
Pakistan's failure to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and in a Hitachi spokesman's words "the desire
not to become the next Toshiba vis-a-vis the United States,"
Hitachi refused to assist in maintenance of the equipment,
the document revealed.
During the first week of
last month, CIA's director, George Tenet, said the US
spy agency had deep knowledge of the activities Dr Abdul
Qadeer Khan. He said that "with the help of the British,
we pieced together the picture of the network, revealing
its subsidiaries, scientists, front companies, agents,
finances and manufacturing plants on three continents.
Our spies penetrated the network through a series of daring
operations over several years."
United States Secretary
of State Colin Powell is expected next week to hold talks
with Pakistani officials on a number of issues including
non-proliferation and the Proliferation Security Initiative,
aimed at blocking dual use technologies which could be
used in WMD programmes.